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EVIDENCE AS TO SIMILAR OFFENSES, ACTS
OR TRANSACTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES
MAX D. MELVILLE
of the Denver Bar

This is one of a series of memoranda on criminal law questions
prepared under the direction of Bert M. Keating, Denver District
Attorney, for the use of his staff and for distribution to other
prosecuting attorneys in Colorado.
The general rule is that evidence is inadmissible which shows
that the accused has committed a crime wholly independent of the
one for which he is being tried. No one is to be convicted of one
crime by proof that he is guilty of another. Such evidence tends
to prejudice the accused with the jury, multiplies the issues and
is likely to confuse and mislead the jury. See Warlord v. People,
43 Colo. 107, 112, 96 P. 556; Jaynes v. People, 44 Colo. 535, 543,
99 P. 325.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE

Two exceptions to the general rule exist: (1) Evidence as
to similar offenses, not too remote in time to be of evidentiary
value,' is admissible to show scheme, plan, design, motive, intent,
knowledge or identity, or any material combination of them; (2)
evidence as to other offenses is necessarily admissible when they
are so interwoven with the charged offense that it is impossible
adequately to show such charged transaction without relating them.
OFFER AND RECEPTION OF SUCH EVIDENCE

When evidence as to similar offenses is about to be offered,
the prosecutor should explain the specific purpose for which it is
being presented. When it is received, the court should then spe, , •The question of excluding evidence because of remoteness rests
largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. Remoteness is a matter of
degree. Its essence is such as a want of open and visible connection between
the evidentiary and principal facts that, all things considered, the former is not
worthy or safe to be admitted in proof of the latter. The term is one which has
regard to factors other than mere lapse of time; and it is said that, while time
may be a practically controlling feature in some situations, yet comparatively
few generalizations based upon lapse of time alone can be made safely; that
evidence which is relevant, as directly tending to prove a fact in issue, is not
incompetent merely because of remoteness in point of time; and that remoteness
depends to a large extent on the nature of the case. Even where the evidence
is very remote, the question must be determined by the circumstances. However,
the question of remoteness so frequently arises in connection with the matter
of time that it may be stated as a general rule that, to be admissible, evidence
must not be so remote in point of time as to be immaterial." 22 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 638.
For a practical application of the test, see Rice v. People, 55 Colo. 506, 136
P. 74, and Coates v. People, 106 Colo. 438, 487-488, 106 P. 2d 354, discussed, at
page 8 herein. See also Perry v. People, 116 Colo. 440, 445, 181 P. 2d 439, and
Thorp v. People, 110 Colo. 7, 11, 129 P. 2d 296, discussed at page 9 herein.
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cifically instruct the jurors as to the very limited purpose for
which it is received and for which they may consider it. Jaynes
v. People, 44 Colo. 535, 544, 99 P. 325; Schneider v. People, 118
Colo. 543, 558-559, 199 P. 2d 873; Sanders v. People, 109 Colo.
243, 247, 125 P. 2d 154.
In Jaynes v. People, supra., the procedure is thus set forth:
The general rule is that evidence is not admissible
which shows or tends to show that the accused has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for
which he is on trial. * * *. To this rule, however, there
are exceptions, as where the evidence of another offense
tends to prove some element of the one for which the accused is being tried, or the motive for committing the
acts which it is claimed constitute the offense for which
he is being tried, are committed by the accused for some
particular purpose which he intended to accomplish. * * *
When such testimony is received the trial judge
should then limit it to the purpose for which it is admitted. Perhaps we have never determined that a failure
to so limit it when not requested by the defendant is
reversible error, but we have intimated in Warford v.
People, supra (43 Colo. 107, 96 P. 556), that this course
should be pursued by trial courts.
We also think that when evidence of the character
under consideration is offered by th. utLric
.e
attorney,
good practice requires that he. should state the purpose
for which it is offered, and that the trial judge in the instructions given, when requested by the defendant, should
instruct the jury on the subject of the purpose for which
they may consider such testimony. These precautions
should be observed because of the fact, as above indicated,
that such evidence tends to create a prejudice in the minds
of the jury; but of this he will not be permitted to complain if the evidence is competent, and his rights are
safeguarded in the manner we have suggested.
INSTRUCTIONS ON SIMILAR ACTS

While the court opinions dealing with this type of evidence
most frequently refer to similar "crimes" or "offenses," which
is usually what they are, nevertheless, in so far as the jury are
concerned, such acts should be called "other transactions" in offering them in evidence and in the instruction given the jury regarding them. This applies to cases arising under either of the
exceptions to the general rule. In Johnson v. People, 110 Colo.
283, 296, 133 P. 2d 789, it was held that an instruction referring
to "separate and other offenses than the offense charged" was
prejudicial to the defendant. The approved instruction is this:
There is some evidence with reference to other transactions than that charged in the information. This evi-
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dence is admissible only as bearing upon the question of
whether or not the defendant had a plan or design to produce a result of which the act charged in the information
was a part, and you can consider such evidence for no
other purpose. The defendant cannot be tried for or convicted of any other offense not charged in the formation.
See Torbert v. People, 113 Colo. 294, 303, 156 P. 2d 128;
Silliman v. People, 114 Colo. 130, 145, 162 P. 2d 793; Perry v.
People, 116 Colo. 440, 444, 181 P. 2d 439.
QUANTUM OF PROOF
The evidence as to other transactions need not prove them
beyond a reasonable doubt, but need only tend to prove defendant
guilty thereof. State v. Dougherty, 266 Ill. 420, 107 N. E. 695,
701; Lund v. State, 207 Ind. 347, 190 N. E. 850, 853; State v. Hyde,
234 Mo. 200, 136 S. W. 316, 332; State v. Meininger, 306 Mo. 675,
268 S. W. 71, 77-78; State v. Blackwell, 65 Nev. 405, 200 P. 2d
698, 699; Scott v. State, 107 Oh. St. 475, 141 N. E. 19, 26, overruling an earlier case; 22 C. J. S. Criminal Law §690. Contra,
Lankford v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. 442, 244 S. W. 389.
No JEOPARDY AS TO SIMILAR ACTS
Evidence as to similar acts for their bearing on the issue of
frame of mind or identity of defendant in the charged offense
does not constitute former jeopardy as to such acts if they are
subsequently prosecuted. They are not in issue in the charged
offense and cannot be adjudicated. 22 C. J. S. Criminal Law §243,
p. 377; United States v. Brimsdon, D. C. Mo., 23 F. Supp. 510;
State v. Momb, 154 Kan. 435, 119 P. 2d 544; State v. Healy,
(Minn.) 161 N. W. 726, L. R. A. 1917D 726. Kansas now has a
statute (G. S. 1935, 62-1449) creating jeopardy as to similar offenses if such a crime could have been charged in the indictment
or information for the crime on trial in a separate count as properly joinable offenses, or if the prosecution could have relied upon
one of them for conviction under the charge on trial, as in sex
cases where no specific date is charged and a number of offenses
against the woman by the defendant within the statute of limitations are shown. It will be noticed that it required a statute to
accomplish this.
WHERE OTHER OFFENSES SHOWN IN CONFESSION

If the similar offenses appear in an accused's confession of
the charged crime, they are admissible as part of such confession
without further proof. Schneider v. People, 118 Colo. 543, 553,
558, 199 P. 2d 873. And see Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 207, 212,
158 P. 2d 447. As will be seen at a later point (p. 5, par. 3), the
offer and reception of such evidence must be handled with the
same care as is emphasized in Jaynes v. People, supra.
This principle that evidence of other crimes appearing in a
confession of the charged offense is admissible as a part of such
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confession is thus stated in 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), §2100e,
page 497:
Of course, the prosecution may desire here to invoke
the rule (post, §2115) allowing the whole [confession]
to be put in. This is usually the case where the confession contains a mention of another crime committed by
the accused. On the usual principles (ante, §§194, 300367), this additional crime would ordinarily not be provable for its own sake; yet under the present principle
and that of §2115, post, the accused's allusion to it in
his confession may and must be listened to if it is a part
of the one entire statement confessing the crime charged
at bar.
Wigmore's statement of this principle was specifically adopted
and quoted in Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 217, 212, 158 P. 2d
447. There, defendant, charged with the murder of her newborn
child, signed a confession not only admitting that murder, but
also relating that she had drowned two other of her newborn
babies, the bodies of all three having been found at one time in
a chest or box. Of this confession, the supreme court said:
The third was an objection to the admission of defendant's written confession, and the fourth was a motion
that the confession be withdrawn and the jury instructed
tn diQreard it hnh n the ground that the confession
involved three separate alleged crimes. These were without merit, under the rule that "where the confession contains a mention of another crime committed by the accused," his "allusion to it in his confession may and must
be listened to if it is a part of the one entire statement
confessing the crime charged at bar." Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.), vol. VII, p. 497, §2100(e). * * *
In addition to the fact that this evidence was so intermingled that it was impossible to make proof regarding the finding of the one body without showing the finding of the other two, the evidence concerning the two
earlier babies was admissible otherwise in proof of deliberation in the crime charged, rather than the frantic
hysteria of tragedy and inexperience, and also in proof
of a preconceived plan of disposing of defendant's offspring in case of pregnancy resulting from her amours.
Further, it strengthens the presumption and proof of life,
and the possession of the three bodies strengthens the
identity of defendant in whose possession they were found
as the perpetrator of the crime.
The principle again was applied in Schneider v. People, 118
Colo. 543, at 552-553 and 558, 199 P. 2d 873. There, defendant
was accused of a murder, which the evidence showed was in the
course of a robbery. He made an oral confession, which he later
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repeated twice, in which he admitted the murder charged and
also confessed that later he had committed two similar crimes in
Michigan, they being perpetrated in substantially the same manner and for a like purpose as the murder charged. Over the objection of defendant, the trial court admitted testimony as to these
confessions in their entirety "solely for the purpose of showing
intent, motive, plan, or design, of the defendant in the alleged
commission of the act charged in the information." The jury
were also charged, "Such evidence is to be considered by you for
the indicated purpose only, and under no circumstances are you
to consider it for any other purpose whatsoever."
The supreme court noted, as will be seen presently, that a
great diversity of opinion existed among the authorities as to the
admissibility of an entire confession, and then concluded that in
Colorado the entire confession is admissible. In discussing the
matter, the supreme court said (118 Colo. 552):
Counsel for defendant rely upon the general rule that
evidence is inadmissible which shows, or even tends to
show, that the defendant has committed a crime wholly
independent of the offense for which he is on trial, but
they also recognize that there are many exceptions to
this rule. In Colorado we have held that some of the exceptions to the general rule, equally well-settled as the
rule itself, are that it is competent to show that defendant on trial for a specific 'offense has participated in
similar crimes in order to establish either motive, intent.
plan, design or scheme, and to establish defendant's identity, and such evidence is not inadmissible merely because
it establishes that defendant is guilty of another crime
[citing Colorado cases].
The general rule for which defendant contents is inapplicable in the present case. Here, defendant, so far
as is disclosed by the record, made a free and voluntary
confession in which he not only admitted the murder of
Ford, with which crime he was charged, but in the same
confession, at the same time, and as an integral part
thereof, he admitted that he had been guilty of similar
robberies, kidnappings and murders subsequent to the one
for which he was to be tried. Here the only question
for our determination is whether the entire confession
was properly admitted, or whether only that part directly pertaining to the Ford murder was admissible. In
determining this question we have read and carefully
considered all decisions. called to our attention by defendant as well as many others. We find that there is a
great diversity of opinion as to the admissibility of an
entire confession, but have concluded that in this and
some other jurisdictions the question has been determined adversely to defendant's contention. * * *
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From a careful consideration of our decision in Reppin v. People, supra (95 Colo. 192, 34 P. 2d 71), and
Williams v. People, supra (114 Colo. 217, 158 P. 2d 447),
we are persuaded that in this jurisdiction when a defendant charged with a criminal offense, even though
that offense be murder, makes a free and voluntary confession, either oral or written, in which he admits his
guilt of the offense charged, and in the same confession
and at the same time admits that he participated in and
committed other similar offenses, such confession is admissible in evidence and is relevant and may be considered by the jury as bearing upon the motive, intent, plan,
scheme and design to establish the commission of the
crime charged.
When such a confession is offered in its entirety, the
district attorney should explain the purpose for which
the evidence of offenses other than that charged is offered,
and the court should instruct the jury as to the purpose
of the evidence and that it is limited in its consideration
of such other offenses. If this procedure is followed, no
error is committed.
APPLIES TO EITHER ORAL OR WRITTEN CONFESSION

It should be noticed that Williams v. People, supra, involved
a written confession, while Schneider v. People, supra, related to
an oral confession, and

that

thle .Schtneider case specifically states

that the principle is applicable to "either oral or written" confessions.
EXAMPLES OF THE GENERAL RULE

As stated, the general rule is that evidence which shows or
tends to show the commission of unrelated crimes by a defendant
is inadmissible.
It is clear from the Colorado cases that the mere fact that
such other acts constituted a crime of the same name as that for
which defendant is on trial is not of itself sufficient to warrant
admission of evidence as to them under the exception relating to
scheme, plan, design, intent or identity. It must appear that
they are so connected in time and so similar in their other relations to the crime charged as to throw light upon it from the view
of the specific purpose for which they are offered. See Elliott v.
People, 56 Colo. 236, 240, 138 P. 39.
The specific point for which such acts are to be shown must
be definitely stated, and the question of their admissibility must
be tested solely by that point. It is not enough that they might
be admissible under some other point within the Exception. Thus,
in Webb v. People, 97 Colo. 262, 265-266, 49 P. 2d 381, the district
attorney offered the evidence of an alleged similar offense for the
purpose "of showing intent to commit robbery, and for that purpose only." The court's instruction, however, stated that the evidence was admissible only "as bearing upon the question of intent
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or motive of the defendant in connection with the crime here
charged or of whether or not the defendant had a plan or design
to produce a result of which the act charged in the information
was a part." Defendant objected on the ground that the offer had
been limited to "intent," and that "no mention was made of a
plan or design, nor does the testimony tend to show any plan or
design." The trial court overruled the objection, and the supreme
court held that this was error because "there was nothing in the
evidence to indicate the kind of 'plan or design' which can be
proved under the recognized exception."
Again, in Cargill v. People, 73 Colo. 218, 220, 214 P. 387,
Cargill and another were charged with the burglary of a drug
store in Colorado Springs. This other man, who was then serving
a sentence for the burglary, testified for the prosecution and was
permitted to testify that about a month before the burglary he
and Cargill had burglarized a residence in the same city. The
trial court allowed the evidence on the theory of corroboration
and explanation, and told the jury that it was to be considered
only as tending to show plan or scheme. The supreme court held
that the admission of the evidence was error because it failed
"entirely to disclose any plan or scheme." The court recognized,
however, that the evidence of other offenses is admissible in burglary cases to show identity, intent, motive or system. The evidence in question clearly was admissible to show identity if it had
been offered for that purpose. Moreover, it is now settled that
in burglary cases such evidence is admissible to show scheme, plan
and design to gain a livelihood through the commission of burglaries. Perry v. People, 116 Colo. 440, 446, 181 P. 2d 439.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE GENERAL RULE

An example of the enforcement of the general rule where the
supposed similar offense was of a different character appears in
Wood v. People, 60 Colo. 211, 213, 151 P. 941. There, where the
charge was that Wood and Miller had committed a robbery, Miller
became a witness for the prosecution, and the question arose as
to how long the pair had been acquainted. The prosecution was
permitted to introduce evidence tending to show that Wood was
guilty of criminal sexual relations with Miller's sister, and the
conviction of Wood was reversed because of the admission of that
evidence, the supreme court saying: "Whether Wood kept company with Mamie-had slept in the same bed with her-was wholly
immaterial, for the simple reason that such proof was not essential, or in any wise necessary, to the proof of acquaintanceship
of Wood and Miller. The minds of the jury must not be prejudiced against the prisoner unless the proof of the case requires it."
In Munfrada v. People, 99 Colo. 80, 60 P. 2d 223, where Munfrada and another were on trial for the theft of seed potatoes, it
was held reversible error for the trial court to have allowed the
prosecutor to inquire of Munfrada on cross-examination as to his
possible theft of a tire in an entirely distinct transaction.
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Nor can a sweeping generality as to other offenses by a defendant be permitted in evidence. Thus, in Sanders v. People, 109
Colo. 243, 246, 125 P. 2d 154, it was held reversible error for the
trial court to fail to strike out the testimony of a police witness
that, "I handled the man (defendant) before. He has a record
a mile long."
EXAMPLES OF EXCEPTION 1

The first exception is that where intent, knowledge, scheme,
plan, design, motive or identity is relevant to the issue in the
charged offense, similar acts by the defendant are admissible in
evidence for the bearing they may have in aiding determination
of such particular point or points, even though such evidence may
show the commission of another crime, "provided such extraneous transactions are so connected as to time and are so similar
in their other relations" that the same may be attributed to them
all. Elliott v. People, 56 Colo. 236, 240, 138 P. 39; Warford v.
People, 43 Colo. 107, 112, 96 P. 556; Williams v. People, 114 Colo.
207, 213, 158 P. 2d 447; Perry v. People, 116 Colo. 440, 444.
"Such evidence has been admitted for such purpose for about
a century" (Whitfield v. People, [1926] 79 Colo. 208, 215, 244 P.
470), and although the evidence may be prejudicial to the defendant in the minds of the jury, "of this he will not be permitted to
complain if the evidence is competent." Jaynes v. People, 113 Colo.
294, 303, 156 P. 2d 128. Even if develops that the other acts may
have been legitimate, the defendant cannot be prejudiced thereby.
Torbert v. People, 113 Colo. 294, 303, 158 P. 2d 128; and see Moore
v. People-......
Colo .......
243 P. 2d 425, 430.
This same exception applies in civil fraud cases, where intent
is in issue, to show knowledge and intent to defraud. Sheridan
Oil Corp. v. Davidson, 75 Colo. 584, 588-589, 227 P. 553, cited in
Whitfield v. People, 79.Colo. 108, 115, 244 P. 470; Alley v. Tovey,
78 Colo. 432, 534-535, 242 P. 999, distinguishing Platt v. Walker,
69 Colo. 584, 196 P. 190, and Western Co. v. Creaghe, 71 Colo. 334,
206 P. .795. See 37 C. J. S. Fraud §113, p. 424.
The doctrine of similar offenses in sex cases is considered
later herein (p. 12) because of some limitations in the rule of
Exception 1.
Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192, 34 P. 2d 71, illustrates both
the general rule excluding, and this Exception 1 permitting evidence of similar offenses to show design, scheme, plan, motive,
knowledge or identity. Reppin pleaded guilty to committing a
murder which occurred in the course of a robbery, and the jury
fixed the penalty at death. The supreme court set aside the conviction because the prosecution was permitted to show (1) that
Reppin admitted arrest for conspiracy in a robbery some years
before in Newark, New Jersey, and also (2) that "he had a vision
of being able to build up a gang of about six men to go out to
the Broadmoor Hotel and catch it when there was a large num-
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ber of diners in the dining room of the hotel, and hold up the
dining room," and also (3) that he and a companion went to a
place called the "Pot and Spigot," intending to rob it, but that
the companion "got yellow" and the scheme was abandoned. The
supreme court said that evidence as to those facts was inadmissible under the exception because, "No holdup occurred, nor was
one attempted."
On the other hand, the court held that it had been proper to
admit in evidence, under this Exception 1, admissions of the
defendant that he and others had (1) burglarized a store and
stolen three guns, one of which was the murder weapon, and (2)
were in the "Country Club stickup," had drawn a gun on the men
in charge, tied them, and taken $12 from the cash register; and
(3) on the next night had held up a station attendant at gun
point, locked him in a toilet and then taken money from a till.
The supreme court said that these offenses were sufficiently connected in point of time and the same motive might be imputed to
the robbery in which the murder charged had occurred; and
further that the evidence of them bore upon the intent of the
defendant and the motive which prompted the homicide for which
he was being tried.
Coates v. People, 106 Colo. 483, 487-488, 106 P. 2d 364, presents a bizarre application of Exception 1. Defendant was charged
with murdering a police officer who intercepted him while he was
forcing one Virginia Garcia to accompany him. She testified that
defendant had tried to get her to "hustle" for him, and that she
had shared her earnings with him at times. She had been living
with another man for three months when defendant came and
got her. He threatened her erstwhile paramour and another man
when they interfered, and dragged her along until the officer intervened. In ruling that evidence as to defendant's pandering operations with Miss Garcia was admissible to show motive, the supreme court said:
It cannot be disputed that Coates considered her an
economic asset and that he would endeavor to frustrate
any attempt to take her away from him. This sufficiently
appears from defendant's own testimony on direct examination when in response to the question, "There has
been some testimony, Joe, that you used Virginia Garcia
as a prostitute and collected money from her; is that
true? He answered, "Sure, yes, years ago, about-sure,
I have done that." The evidence justified the conclusion
that the same relationship continued up to the very time
of the homicide, and that she had been "hustling" for him
right along. A reasonable inference from the testimony
in this case was that defendant shot Renovato because he
thought the officer was attempting to take his "woman"
away from him.
Smaldone v. People, 103 Colo. 498, 88 P. 2d 103, demonstrates
the admissibility of evidence of collateral offenses which are not
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the same crime charged but tend to show the motive for it. There,
two Smaldone brothers and one Stephens were charged with assault to murder and conspiracy to do so, the attempt at murder
having been by placing a bomb in the automobile of the victim,
one Barnes. All of these persons were professional gamblers, the
Smaldones and Barnes having worked for Stephens at Blakeland,
his gambling resort which had been closed by injunction. Barnes
located another likely spot in the vicinity and asked Stephens to
join in a new gambling enterprise, but the latter demurred at the
risk of operating so close to the former enterprise. Barnes got
other partners and opened the new place, Cottonwood Ranch. After
a month's operation, seven men, two of whom were identified as
the Smaldones, robbed the place and took a safe containing $1,600;
and presently the authorities closed the Ranch. Barnes asked
Stephens to join him in reopening. He testified that he offered
Stephens a 20 per cent interest, but the latter demanded one-third
and said Barnes would not "live a week" if he reopened without
him. Four days later, Barnes having reopened, a bomb exploded
in his automobile, severely injuring him. The supreme court, in
affirming the conviction, held that it had been proper to allow
evidence (1) that Stephens had counseled and advised in the opening of Cottonwood Ranch, had demanded a share of the illict proceeds, and had threatened Barnes' life, and (2) that the Smaldones
had been participants in the robbery of Barnes' place, and that
even
Stephens knew they were under suspici.,
though some of these things showed the commission of other
crimes, nevertheless the evidence went to show motive for the
Smaldones and Stephens to combine to kill Barnes, even though
the motives were different-the Smaldones to escape liability for
the robbery, and Stephens to make good his threat. It should be
noticed that the evidence as to robbery by the Smaldones extended
only to an accusation by identification and not to a formal charge
or a conviction.
Wilson v. People, 103 Colo. 150, 165-166, 84 P. 2d 463, illustrates the admissibility of like acts, including convictions, in the
case of continuing offenses. There, defendant was charged with
gambling for a livelihood and police officer Finney was permitted
to testify to a former arrest of the defendant and as to his pleading guilty of conducting a gambling house when arrested under
circumstances similar to those in the case on trial. In holding
that such evidence was properly admitted, the supreme court said:
"Gambling for a livelihood was one of the charges. From the
very nature of that offense it is a continuing one and may and
does involve man separate acts. In connection with defendants'
reputation as gamblers, to which detective Finney also testified,
we think evidence of the former arrest of Wilson and his plea of
guilty was admissible."
Hamilton v. People, 87 Colo. 307, 309, 287 P. 651, shows that
the fact that defendant has been convicted of and served a sen-
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tence for another crime may be shown in the first instance by
the prosecution if it is relevant and material to some issue in the
criminal case on trial. Hamilton and one Stone were on trial for
confidence game. They had been in penitentiary together. Hamilton was living in Denver and when Stone was released from the
penitentiary he took up his abode at the same hotel where Hamilton was living, and within a week they were perpetrating the
swindle for which they were being tried. They had been associated
together before the penitentiary confinement, and on cross-examination Stone was asked when he next saw Hamilton after that
earlier association and replied, "In Canon City. In the penitentiary." Hamilton contended that this was an unjustified attack
on his reputation by showing he was an ex-convict and violated
the rule of Ryan v. People, 66 Colo. 208, 180 P. 84, that the character of a defendant may not be attacked by the prosecution unless
it is put in issue by him. In rejecting this contention of error,
the supreme court said: "If the rule that the prosecution cannot,
in the first instance, directly or indirectly attack the character
of the defendant by showing conviction of guilt of other offenses,
be given the construction and application here contended for, then
the penitentiary becomes a sanctuary where conspiracies may be
hatched and crimes committed with impunity, since the people
can take -no step toward their disclosure without revealing the
place of their perpetration, and since that of itself casts a cloud
upon the reputation of the accused. There is no such law. The
true rule is that evidence of former convictions or other offenses
may not, in the first instance, be directly or indirectly introduced
if not material and relevant to the fact in issue, but, if so material
and relevant, it is not excluded." 8 R. C. L. p. 200, §195; State v.
Moran, 131 Ia. 645, 109 N. W. 187.
OTHER ACTS EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER

When meeting the other tests, the similar offenses offered in
evidence may have occurred either before or after the crime for
which the defendant is on trial. Chasse v. People, 119 Colo. 160,
163, 201 P. 2d 378 (confidence game); Schneider v. People, 118
Colo. 543, 199 P. 2d 873 (murder) ; Perry v. People, 116 Colo. 440,
445, 181 P. 2d 439 (burglary).
Prior offenses, prosecution of which would be barred by the
statute of limitations, may be shown. Perry v. People, 116 Colo.
440, 445, 181 P. 2d 439 (burglary) ; Thorp v. People, 110 Colo. 7,
11, 129 P. 2d 296 (embezzlement).
In statutory rape cases, however, a different rule prevails.
In them, similar acts which would be barred by the statute of
limitations may not be shown. Abbott v. People, 89 Colo. 120, 121,
299 P. 153, following Bigcraft v. People, 30 Colo. 298, 70 P. 417,
and Curtis v. People, 72 Colo. 350, 211 P. 381. The reason for
this may be that in such cases a number of acts will be shown
and the prosecution later elect upon which it will rely, and any
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other rule might lead to a conviction of a barred offense. See
Schreiner v. People, 95 Colo. 393, 395, 36 P. 2d 764.
"The length of time over which any inquiry as to other offenses committed by accused may extend is within the trial court's
discretion; it has been said that, as a general rule, it must appear
that the evidence of other offenses relates to offenses which occurred shortly before or after the commission of the offense on
trial." Perry v. People, 116 Colo. 440, 445, 181 P. 2d 439. But it
should be noticed that immediately preceding the statement just
quoted, the court said: "Unrelated crimes which were barred by
the statute of limitations may be introduced to show general plan,
and prior crimes committed three years before are not too remote."
It should also be noted that it is not the date of the transaction supplying the motive and intent for the similar crime
which controls, but rather the date of the act relied upon as such
similar offense; and there may be several acts springing from
that motivating transaction and they may be a year or two apart.
See Thorp v. People, 110 Colo. 7, 11, 129 P. 2d 296.
Schneider v. People, 118 Colo. 543, 199 P. 2d 873, supplies an
example of the admission of subsequent offenses as being relevant
and bearing upon the motive, intent, plan, scheme and design to
establish the crime charged. Defendant, on trial for a murder
which occurred in connection with kidnapping and a robbery,
made oral confessions admitting not only that crime but two subsequent murders following kidnapping and robbery in another
state. It was held that these other crimes were admissible as part
of the confessions for their bearing on the defendant's motive,
plan, scheme, design and intent in the crime for which he was
then on trial.
EXAMPLES OF EXCEPTION 2

The second exception is that other offenses may be shown in
evidence when they are so interwoven with the principal transaction that it is impossible properly to show such charged offense
without relating them.
In Abshier v. People, 87 Colo. 507, 289 P. 1081, defendant received the death penalty for a murder occurring during a holdup
in a bank. It was held proper to admit evidence that defendant and
his accomplices, in the course of the robbery and escape, had kidnapped a bank employee, carried him with them into Kansas, and
then killed him to escape detection; and also, for the same purpose, had killed a doctor whom they had inveigled to their hideout
to administer to an accomplice wounded during the robbery. Of
this evidence, the supreme court said:
Evidence of other crimes committed in Kansas was
admissible. Such other offenses were indivisibly connected
with, incidental to, and in furtherance of the plans of defendant and his confederates to rob the bank at Lamar,
flee, conceal the evidence of their robbery and murder of
Parrish, and escape pursuit. These acts were all a part
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of a single transaction, an account of which could not be
well related without the whole story appearing. As such,
they were admissible.
In Silliman v. People, 114 Colo. 130, 145, 162 P. 2d 793, the
defendant was accused of murdering his wife by poison. He had
given her a drink of poisoned brandy, and she gave her infant
daughter a sip of this and then consumed the remainder. Both
died within a few minutes. At the trial, reference was made to
the death of the child, and in holding this not to have been prejudicial error, the court said: "When we consider the fact that the
death of the wife, with the murder of whom defendant was charged,
and that of his daughter, occurred almost simultaneously in the
room in defendant's home, it is apparent that the death of the
daughter would be referred to inadvertently by one or more witnesses."
In Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 207, 212, 158 P. 2d 447, defendant was on trial for the murder of her newborn child, one of
three babies she evidently had killed, and whose bodies were discovered at one time in the same box. It was ruled that evidence
as to the finding of the other two bodies was admissible, not only
for the purpose of showing scheme, intent and identity, but also
because such evidentiary matter was "so intermingled that it was
impossibl6 to prove the case relied upon without also bringing
out the facts as to the finding of the other bodies."
THE SEX-OFFENSE EXCEPTION

Proof of similar offenses in sex cases may be said to be a
restriction of Exception 1 to the general rule in certain circumstances. While it is well established in Colorado that this kind
of evidence is admissible in that type of case (Shier v. People, 116
Colo. 353, 359, 181 P. 2d 366) in corroboration and explanation of
the act charged (Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532, 535, 52 P. 671;
Laycock v. People, 66 Colo. 441, 445, 182 P. 880), it is also settled that, unlike the situation as to other crimes, when the act
charged, if proved, speaks for itself, as in the actual taking of
indecent liberties (as distinguished from an "assault with intent
to rape" or an "attempt" at indecent liberties), such similar acts
are admissible in evidence only where they were against the victim
of the act charged. Dockerty v. People, 74 Colo. 113, 114-115,
219 P. 220.
But, as will appear later (p. 15), evidence as to similar acts
against others than the victim is admissible where the issue of
"intent" is involved, as where defendant admits the act but attempts to explain or excuse it, or as in assault with intent to rape
or attempt at indecent liberties with a child under the age of 16.
In Dockerty v. People, supra, 74 Colo. 113, 114, 219 P. 220,
defendant was charged, not with attempting to take, but with an
actual taking of, indecent liberties with the person of his 15-yearold daughter. On the theory that it tended to show design, motive

248

DICTA

July, 1952

or intent under Exception 1, the prosecution was permitted to
show acts of sexual intercourse between defendant and an older
daughter some months before the offense charged. The conviction
of Dockerty was reversed by the supreme court on the ground
that the admission of the evidence of such other acts constituted
prejudicial error. It was said:
The exception is well established, and it is true, as
the state contends, that the exception is broadened in case
of sexual offenses. But nowhere does it appear that the
conduct of a defendant with a person other than the one
connected with the offense charged is admissible, even
in the class of cases mentioned. Indeed, the law is settled that similar acts as to other persons cannot be shown
in evidence. Wharton, Criminal Evidence (9th ed.) §46.
In this case the evidence to which objection is made was
clearly inadmissible. The only direct testimony as to the
alleged criminal act was that of the prosecuting witness,
and the defense was an absolute denial. Had there been
an admission of the acts, with an attempt to explain or
excuse them, the question of intent might have been presented. The testimony as to defendant's actions, if believed by the jury, would establish his guilt, both as to
acts and intent. But, in addition, this testimony included
declarations of the defendant which were conclusive of
'
no possibe reathe purpose of the acts. There was, then,
son for admitting the testimony of the other daughter.
* * * In People v. Lonsdale, 122 Mich. 388, 81 N. W. 277,
it is said: "Where the intent or guilty knowledge is a
necessary conclusion from the act done, proof of other
offenses of a similar character is inadmissible, and violates the rule that the evidence must be confined to the
issue."
The holding of the Dockerty case is, then, that since the defendant denied doing the acts charged, rather than admitting and
attempting to explain or excuse them, and since the victim's testimony, if believed by the jury, showed acts which we per se indecent liberties, "intent" was not in issue, and, therefore, there was
neither room nor need for, nor relevancy to, further evidence by
way of proof of similar acts against others as tending to show
intent.
It appears from the original record in the Dockerty casewhich the writer has carefully read-that the defendant's declarations, referred to in the opinion, simply supplied corroboration that
defendant knew his acts were indecent liberties, since he was
supplementing his acts with verbal solicitation of sexual intercourse. The acts included his touching of the victim's private
parts. The declarations demonstrated his desire to have sexual
intercourse, but his acts spoke for themselves as unmistakably
being criminal indecent liberties with the person of his daughter.
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If the jury believed her testimony, they could not escape concluding that indecent liberties in fact had been taken.
The court's statement that, "Indeed, the law is settled that
similar acts as to other persons cannot be shown in evidence,".
obviously must be limited to sex cases and cannot apply to such
offenses as larceny, burglary, and the like, where, as has been
seen from pages 9-11, the admission of similar acts as to persons
other than the victim of the charged offense has been repeatedly
upheld by the Colorado supreme court. The authority cited in
the opinion (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, §46) refers to sex
offenses. But the court's statement undeniably gives the general
rule in sex cases where the criminal intent or guilty knowledge
is a necessary conclusion from the act done.
The court recognized, however, in the Dockerty case that a
different rule applies if "intent" is an issue in sex cases when it
added: "In this case the evidence to which objection is made was
clearly inadmissible. The only direct testimony as to the alleged
criminal act was that of the prosecuting witness, and the defense
was an absolute denial. Had there been an admission of the acts,
with an attempt to explain or excuse them, the question of intent
might have been presented."
It is clear from this statement that if the question of intent
is open and in issue, as in the hypothetical case stated by the
court, then the full sweep of Exception 1, admitting similar acts
with others as bearing on intent, would apply. And it follows logically that where the charge is "assault with intent to commit rape"
or "attempt at indecent liberties"-and intent is thus an essential
ingredient of the offense and an issue which the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt-evidence of similar acts with
others would be admissible if meeting the other requirements of
Exception 1. This matter will be discussed at length later, beginning on page 15.
WHERE PART OF THE RES GESTAE

Similar acts with others may be shown in sex cases, however,
if they occurred during the principal transaction charged and
are part of the res gestae. In Granato v. People, 97 Colo. 303, 49
P. 2d 431, where the defendant was charged with the statutory
rape of one girl in an automobile, it was held proper to show that
as a part of this same transaction he had aided a male companion
in forcing another girl from the automobile so that the second
man could rape her, thus showing him as being guilty of participating in a second rape as an accessory before the fact. The
court held that such evidence related to facts that constituted an
"inseparable part of the entire transaction."
This same principle in sex offenses was applied in the following cases from other jurisdictions: People v. Kruvosky, 53 Cal.
App. 744, 200 P. 831; People v. Hunt, 17 Cal. App. 2d 284, 286,
61 P. 2d 1208, 1209; People v. Paragone, 327 Ill. 463, 158 N. E.
716, 718-719, distinguishing People v. Gibson, 255 Ill. 303, 99 N. E.
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599, cited in Dockerty v. People, supra, 74 Colo. 113, 115, 219 P.
220, on the point of a self-speaking act (and see State v. Dowell,
47 Idaho 457, 276 P. 39, 40) ; Landn v. State, 77 Okl. Cr. R. 190,
.140 P. 2d 242; State v. Gerrish, 161 Ore. 76, 87 P. 2d 769; Turner
v. State, 187 Tenn. 319, 213 S. W. 2d 281; State v. McDowell, 61
Wash. 398, 112 P. 521, 522; State v. Priest, 132 Wash. 580, 232
P. 353, 354.
ACTS SHOWING PLAN OR SCHEME

Moreover, there is ample authority to the effect that despite
the general rule that sex offenses against others than the prosecutrix are not admissible, nevertheless where the other offense
is committed in circumstances remarkably similar to those in the
offense charged, such evidence is admissible as showing a plan
or scheme to commit the crime in that fashion, even though the
offense was against a person other than the prosecutrix. The theory
of these cases is that where several crimes are committed as part
of one scheme or plan, and are all of the same general character
and tend to the same end, they are relevant to show the process
or motive or design leading up to the particular crime in issue.
See Taylor v. State, 44 Ariz. 13, 97 P. 2d 543, 545; State v. Martinez, 67 Ariz. 389, 198 P. 2d 115, 116-117; People v. Northcott, 209
Cal. 639, 289 P. 634; People v. Cosby, 137 Cal. App. 332, 31 P. 2d
218; People v. Cassandras, 83 Cal. App. 2d 272, 188 P. 2d 546,
551; People v. Sullivan, 96 Cal. App. 2d 742, 216 P. 2d 558, 561;
Commonwealth v. Ransom, 168 Pa. Super. 306, 82 A. 2d 547.
ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT SEX OFFENSE

Dockerty v. People, supra, 74 Colo. 113, 219 P. 220, settles
the proposition that in sex offenses where the charge is of an act
which, if proved, per se shows criminality, and the accused does
not admit the act and attempt to explain or excuse it, evidence
of like acts against others than the particular victim is not admissible. But in that case the court clearly leaves the question open
in situations where "intent" is a material issue, as where an act
which could be construed as an indecent liberty is admitted by
the accused, but he tries to exculpate himself by claiming his act
was not done with wrongful intent. It logically follows that whenever "intent" is an issue, similar acts as against others are relevant
in sex cases and admissible in evidence as bearing on intent; as,
for example, where the charge is "assault with intent to commit
rape" or "attempt to take indecent liberties." In such cases, then,
the following rule of Elliott v. People, 56 Colo. 236, 240, 138 P. 39,
would apply:
The general rule is that a defendant on trial for a
crime shall not be prejudiced in the eyes of the jury by
the admission of testimony tending to prove that he is
guilty of another and distinct crime. This rule should be
carefully observed by trial courts and district attorneys,
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in all cases where applicable. If, however, evidence is
relevant to a material fact in issue in the case on trial,
no valid reason exists for its exclusion because it may
prove, or tend to prove, that the accused committed some
other crime. * * * The authorities are quite uniform to

the effect that when the guilt of a defendant depends
upon the intent, purpose or design, with which an act
was done, other transactions of a similar nature on his
part may be examined into, for the purpose of establishing
such guilty intent, design or purpose, although the facts
thus elicited show the commission of another crime, provided such extraneous transactions are so connected as
to time and so similar in their other relations that the
same motive may be reasonably imputed to them all.
It is obvious that "intent" is of the essence of the offense of
assault with intent to commit rape and must be proved by the
prosecution like any other essential element. The same is true as
to "attempt," for an attempt is "Any overt act done with the
intent to commit a crime and which, but for the interference of
some cause preventing the carrying out of the intent, would have
resulted in the commission of the crime. It consists of two important elements: first, an intent to commit the crime; and second, a direct ineffectual act done towards its commission." 14 Am.
Jur., Criminal Law, §65.
In 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), §357, in applying the Intent
principle to rape, it is said:
The Intent principle (ante, §303) clearly applies
where the act is assumed as otherwise proved and the
intent is in issue; i.e., in such cases, former acts of the
kind are relevant to negative the intent as being of any
other kind than to commit rape. (a) Where the charge
is of assault with intent, the propriety of such evidence
cannot be doubted. There should be some limitation of
time, but merely to avoid the objection of unfair surprise (ante, §194). There need be no limitation as to the
person assaulted, because the purpose is to negative any
other than the rape intent, and a previous rape-assault
on another woman has equal probative value for that
purpose, for it is the general desire to satisfy lust that
is involved in this crime, and no particular woman is
essential to this. Accordingly, where the charge is assault with intent, former acts of the sort should be received without any limitation except as to time; though
the courts can hardly be said to have accepted this result
fully. (b) Where the charge is of rape, the doing of the
act being disputed, it is perhaps still theoretically possible
that the intent should be in issue; but practically, if the
act is proved, there can be no real question as to intent;
and, therefore, the Intent principle has no necessary
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application. The former acts, if available at all, must be
available under the Design principle.
The same view is taken in Wharton's Criminal Evidence (11th
ed.), § 252, where it is said:
Where intent and motive are in issue in sexual crimes,
former acts of the same kind are relevant to show intent,
and to negative the issue that another or different crime
was contemplated or committed than that charged. Thus,
in rape, circumstantial evidence showing prior acts is
relevant where the prior acts are so connected with the
particular crime at issue that the proof of one crime with
its circumstances has some bearing upon the issue on
trial, as showing the intent. Such evidence has a peculiar
relevancy where the charge is assault with intent to commit rape, as in this case the act need not be limited to
the person assaulted, for it is the general purpose that
is involved in the assault, and no particular person is essential to show such purpose and motive, and such evidence is relevant to show the lustful intent.
The following authorities support the proposition that where
intent is in issue, as in assault with intent to rape and inattempt
to take indecent liberties, similar acts with persons other than
the victim are admissible as showing intent: McKenzie v. State,
250 Ala. 178, 33 So. 2d 488; Wilkins v. State, 29 Ala. App. 349,
197 So. 75, 77-79, certiorari denied 240 Ala. 52, 197 So. 8; Hearn
v. State, 206 Ark. 206, 174 S. W. 2d 452, 453; Gerlach v. State,
(Ark.) 229 S. W. 2d 37, 40; People v. Zabel, 95 Cal. App. 2d 486,
213 P. 2d 60, 61; People v. Cosby, 137 Cal. App. 332, 31 P. 2d
218, 220; State v. Dowell, 47 Idaho 457, 276 P. 39; State v. Sheets,
127 Iowa 73, 102 N. W. 415, 416; State v. Desmind, 109 Iowa 72,
80 N. W. 214, 215; State v. Cupit, 189 La. 509, 179 So. 837, 839;
State v. Edwards, 224 N. C. 527, 31 S. E. 2d 516.
SOME OF THE CASES IN POINT

In the discussion on pages 13 and 14 herein of Dockerty v.
People, 74 Colo. 113, 115, 219 P. 220, it was pointed out that the
supreme court there said: "Had there been an admission of the
acts, with an attempt to explain or excuse them, the question of
intent might have been presented." Just such a situation is shown
in People v. Zabel, supra, 95 Cal. App. 2d 486, 213 P. 2d 60, 61,
where it was said:
"Defendant was convicted by a jury of a violation
of Penal Code section 288 alleged to have been committed
upon the person of an 11-year-old girl. The complaining
witness testified that while she was sleeping in defendant's home with one of his stepdaughters defendant came
into the room and placed his hand upon her genitals. Defendant denied this, his testimony being that he noticed
the little girl uncovered and replaced the bed coverings
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over her without touching the body. On cross-examination
defendant stated that he might have touched her shoulder
in placing the covers over her. Later, being shown a
written statement previously given to the District Attorney, in which defendant had stated: "I was a little
unsteady on my feet. I lost my balance. In putting my
hand down to steady myself I came in contact with the
* * * girl on her breast," he repeated: "I was a little
unsteady on my feet and I might have touched her on the
shoulder."
The tenor of defendant's testimony was that he might
have touched the child's body but if he did so it was an
accident and not done deliberately or with lustful intent.
This opened the door to the evidence of which defendant complains on appeal. The people produced in
rebuttal the two stepdaughters of defendant who testified to recurring acts of intimacy committed by defendant on their persons, and also introduced his written
statement in which defendant acknowledged similar acts
with his stepdaughters. The trial court admitted this
evidence for the limited purpose of showing the intent
with which defendant touched the person of the complaining witness if the jury found that he did so, and
the jury was explicitly instructed on the limited purpose
for which this evidence should be considered.
The evidence was properly admitted under the rule
that evidence of similar crime, while ordinarily not admissible, may be admitted to prove intent where there is
an issue and the criminal intent is denied by the defendant. People v. Williams, 6 Cal. 2d 500, 58 P. 2d 917; People
v. Westek, 31 Cal. 2d 459, 190 P. 2d 9; People v. James,
40 Cal. App. 2d 740, 105 P. 2d 947; People v. Clapp, 67
Cal. App. 2d 197, 153 P. 2d 758; People v. Collins, 80 Cal.
App. 2d 526, 182 P. 2d 585. That defendant did not deny
criminal intent in so many words is not important since
such denial was implicit in his claim that if he touched
the child his doing so was accidental; and the only conceivable purpose of this testimony was to negative a
criminal intent.
The younger stepdaughter testified that defendant
stopped his intimacies with her about two years before
the trial. The question whether this evidence was too
remote was primarily for the trial judge and we cannot
hold its admission error, particularly in view of the fact
that the other stepdaughter testified to continuing intimacies up to the time of the offense of which defendant
is accused.
In State v. Edwards, supra, 224 N. C. 527, 31 S. E. 2d 516,
defendant was convicted of attempt at incest and attempt to have
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carnal knowledge of his 14-year-old daughter. It was decided
that evidence was properly admitted that within the preceding
three years defendant had made similar improper advances to
an older daughter, the court saying:
Here, in addition to evidence of incestuous attempts
upon the person of the State's witness by her father, it
was competent for the State to offer evidence tending
to prove similar attempts and advances to another daughter for the purpose of showing the intent as well as the
unnatural lust of the defendant in attempting to commit
the crimes charged in the bills of indictment. Intent is
one of the elements necessary .to sustain a charge of an
attempt to commit a criminal offense.
In State v. Cupit, supra, 189 La. 509, 179 So. 837, 838, defendant was charged with assault to commit rape upon his 14year-old niece. The appellate court held that the trial court had
properly admitted, for its bearing on the issue of intent, evidence
that eight years before defendant had raped another niece. It
was said: "It is true that there is a considerable separation of
time between the commission of the offense charged in this case
and the commission of the prior offenses, but that fact itself is
not sufficient to exclude the evidence of the prior offenses. All
the offenses are not only similar, but also they are so related in
kind that the evidence of the prior offenses clearly served to
illustrate the question of defendant's intent as to the present
offense. * * * Under the circumstances of this case, the difference in time between the offenses is more appropriate to the
weight of the evidence than to its admissibility."
Hearn v. State, supra, 206 Ark. 206, 174 S. W. 2d 452, also is
a case of assault with intent to rape. There, defendant accosted
a young girl at night, seized her and attempted to choke her. "The
prosecuting witness did not testify as to what the appellant said.
or as to any other act that he did which would make this a case of
assault with intent to commit rape as distinguished from an assault with intent to commit some other crime, as for instance an
assault with intent to rob. As evidence of assault with intent to
commit rape, the State was allowed to show two other acts of
misconduct by the defendant, both of a sexual nature. (1) One
witness (a woman) testified that about two months before the
act here involved, the appellant had torn the screen window open
in the kitchen and come' into the house of the witness and awakened her, feeling of her, and then got into bed with her before
she discovered it was not her husband; that the appellant had
grabbed her and started to twist her leg, and she screamed and
the appellant ran. (2) Then another witness (a man) testified
that about two months before the act involved in this case, the
said witness had seen the appellant one night peeping in the window of the home of the witness' brother; and the witness had
taken the appellant to the officers for that offense." The appel-
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late court held that such evidence was properly admitted as bearing on the specific intent with which the defendant had made the
assault charged.
WHEN CROSS-EXAMINATION PROPER

Where criminal intent is in issue and the effect of defendant's
testimony is that he acted in good faith, he may be cross-examined
as to similar offenses. Todd v. People, 82 Colo. 541, 549, 261 P. 661.
EVIDENCE PROPER IN REBUTTAL

Where the defendant's excuses for or explanation of his acts
are tantamount to a denial of criminal intent, he may be crossexamined as to them, and then evidence of similar sex offenses
against others than the immediate victim may be shown in rebuttal. These principles are carefully analyzed and applied in
People v. Westek, 31 Colo. 2d 469, 190 P. 2d 9, 13-16. See also
People v. Knight, 62 Cal. App. 143, 216 P. 96, 97; People v. Harrison, 46 Cal. App. 2d 779, 117 P. 2d 19, 23; People v. Goff, 100
Cal. App. 2d 166, 223 P. 2d 27, 30; and see the same principle in
Cook v. State, 155 Ark. 106, 244 S. W. 735, 736.
ILLUSTRATIVE COLORADO CASES UNDER EXCEPTION 1
Guilty Knowledge: Bruno v. People, 67 Colo. 146, 149, 186
P. 718; Goodfellow v. People, 75 Colo. 243, 246, 224 P. 1051; Whitfield v. People, 79 Colo. 108, 115, 244 P. 470; Helser v. People, 100
Colo. 371, 391, 68 P. 2d 543; Grandbouche v. People, 104 Colo. 175,
187, 89 P. 2d 577.
Intent or Malice: Warford v. People, 43 Colo. 107, 112, 96 P.
556; Clark v. People, 53 Colo. 214, 216, 125 P. 113; Elliott v. People, 56 Colo. 236, 238-240, 138 P. 39; Tracy v. People, 65 Colo. 226,
233, 176 P. 280; Max v. People, 78 Colo. 178, 181-182, 240 P. 679;
Whitfield v. People, 79 Colo. 108, 115, 244 P. 470; Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192, 210, 34 P. 2d 71; Helser v. People, 100 Colo. 371,
390-391, 68 P. 2d 543; Smaldone v. People, 103 Colo. 498, 507-508,
88 P. 2d 103; Grandbouche v. People, 104 Colo. 175, 187, 89 P.
2d 577; Rogers v. People, 104 Colo. 594, 602, 94 P. 2d 594; Clark
v. People, 105 Colo. 335, 338, 97 P. 2d 440; Paine v. People, 106
Colo. 258, 265, 103 P. 2d 686; Peiffer v. People, 106 Colo. 533, 538539, 107 P. 2d 799; Montez v. People, 110 Colo. 208, 221, 132 P.
2nd 970; Jones v. People, 118 Colo. 271, 277, 195 P. 2d 380.
Motive: Warford v. People, 43 Colo. 107, 112, 96 P. 556; Myers
v. People, 65 Colo. 450, 454, 177 P. 145; Bruno v. People, 67 Colo.
146, 149, 186 P. 718; Whitfield v. People, 79 Colo. 108, 115, 244 P.
470; Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192, 210, 34 P. 2d 71; Helser v.
People, 100 Colo. 371, 390, 68 P. 2d 543; Smaldone v. People, 103.
Colo. 498, 507-508; Bacino v. People, 104 Colo. 229, 233, 90 P. 2d 5;
Grandbouche v. People, 104 Colo. 175, 187, 89 P. 2d 577; Coates
v. People, 106 Colo. 483, 487-488, 106 P. 2d 354.
Plan or System: Elliott v. People, 56 Colo. 236, 239-240, 138
P. 39; Castner v. People, 67 Colo. 327, 330, 184 P. 387; Voris v.
People, 75 Colo. 574, 577, 227 P. 551; Max v. People, 78 Colo. 178,
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180-181, 240 P. 679; Webb v. People, 97 Colo. 262, 49 P. 2d 381;
Helser v. People, 100 Colo. 371, 391, 68 P. 2d 543; Thorp v. People,
110 Colo. 7, 11, 129 P. 2d 296; Torbert v. People, 113 Colo. 294,
302, 156 P. 2d 128; Perry v. People, 116 Colo. 440, 445, 181 P. 2d
439; Chasse v. People, 119 Colo. 160, 163, 201 P. 2d 378.
Identity: Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 207, 213, 158 P. 2d
447; and see notes in 3 A. L. R. 1540, 22 A. L. R. 1016, 27 A. L. R.
357 and 63 A. L. R. 602.
IN VARIOUS CRIMES

Abortion: Max v. People, 78 Colo. 178, 181-182, 240 P. 679;
Ferguson v. People, 118 Colo. 54, 56, 192 P. 2d 523.
Assault: Warlord v. People, 43 Colo. 107, 112, 96 P. 556.
Burglary: Longwell v. People, 95 Colo. 403, 405, 36 P. 2d 458;
Perry v. People, 116 Colo. 440, 445, 181 P. 2d 439; Wolff v. People,
123 Colo. 487, 230 P. 2d 581, 583.
Confidence Game: Elliott v. People, 56 Colo. 236, 239-240, 138
P. 39; Roll v. People, 78 Colo. 589, 594, 243 P. 641; Todd v. People, 82 Colo. 541, 261 P. 661; Grandbouche v. People, 104 Colo. 175,
186, 89 P. 2d 573; Peiffer v. People, 106 Colo. 533, 538-539, 107
P. 2d 799; Chasse v. People, 119 Colo. 160, 163, 201 P. 2d. 378.
Conspiracy: Hamilton v. People, 87 Colo. 307, 310, 287 P.
651; Helser v. People, 100 Colo. 371, 390-391, 68 P. 2d 543; Smaldone v. People, 103 Colo. 498, 508, 88 P. 2d 103; Grandbouche v.
People, 104 Colo. 175, 186, 89 P 2d 573; Jones v. People, 118 Colo.
271, 276-277, 195 P. 2d 380.
Embezzlement: Clark v. People, 105 Colo. 335, 338, 97 P. 2d
440; Thorp v. People, 110 Colo. 7, 11, 129 P.2d 296.
False Pretenses: Housh v. People, 24 Colo. 262, 50 P. 1036;
Clarke v. People, 53 Colo. 214, 216, 125 P. 113; Tracy v. People,
65 Colo. 226, 233, 176 P. 280; Whitfield v. People, 79 Colo. 108,
115, 244 P. 470; Montez v. People, 110 Colo. 208, 221, 132 P. 2d 970.
Gambling: Chase v. People, 2 Colo. 509, 514.
Homicide: Hillen v. People, 59 Colo. 280, 282, 149 P. 250;
Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192, 210, 34 P. 2d 71; Coates v. People,
106 Colo. 483, 487-488, 106 P. 2d 354; Williams v. People, 114 Colo.
207, 212, 158 P. 2d 447; Schneider v. People, 118 Colo. 543, 552559, 199 P. 2d 873.
Larceny: Bush v. People, 68 Colo. 75, 80, 187 P. 528; Bacino
v. People, 104 Colo. 229, 233, 90 P. 2d 5; Clark v. People, 105 Colo.
335, 338, 97 P. 2d 440; Perry v. People, 116 Colo. 440, 445, 189 P.
2d 439.
Receiving Stolen Goods: Myers v. People, 65 Colo. 450, 453454, 177 P. 145; Castner v. People, 67 Colo. 327, 330, 184 P. 387;
Bush v. People, 68 Colo. 75, 80, 187 P. 528; Goodfellow v. People,
75 Colo. 243, 246, 224 P. 1051; Burnham v. People, 104 Colo. 472,
475-476, 93 P. 2d 899.
Robbery: Voris v. People, 75 Colo. 574, 577, 227 P. 551.
Short Checks: Rogers v. People, 76 Colo. 181, 182, 230 P. 391;
Chasse v. People, 119 Colo. 160, 163, 201 P. 2d 378.

July, 1952

DICTA

RES GESTAE IN COLORADO
ARTHUR BURKE AND ARTHUR FRAZIN*

A learned chief justice once remarked, "there are few problems in the law of evidence more unsolved than what things are
to be embraced in those occurrences that are designated in the
law as the res gestae." 1 While this is true, it need not be so of
necessity.
The term "res gestae" has been defined as "things done; transactions; essential circumstances surrounding the subject. The circumstances, facts, and declarations which grow out of the main
fact, are contemporaneous with it, and serve to illustrate its character." 2
There is perhaps no state which considers res gestae in as
broad a sense as does Colorado. Professor Wigmore suggests that
res gestae be confined to spontaneous declarations. Most other
text writers admit the existence of verbal acts within the doctrine
of res gestae, whereas, few writers recognize the third category,
referred to here as contemporaneous acts, which Colorado adopts
as part of the res gestae. The wisdom of this third category will
not here be questioned, rather the sole issue to be considered will
be the law of res gestae as actually applied in the Colorado courts.
The three segments to be considered then are contemporaneous acts, verbal acts, and spontaneous declarations. They will
be considered in that order.
The category of contemporaneous acts, while not recognized
by text writers, is easy of definition and comprehension. It is a
doctrine of necessity. There is no basis under the hearsay rule
for excluding testimony concerning these acts. The only objection
to the admission of a contemporaneous act in evidence is that it
may include an offense other than that for which the defendant
is on trial. It is here that the doctrine of necessity applies. If the
act which is in issue can be separated from an act about which testimony would be objectionable then, of course, this should be done,
and the objectionable testimony should be excluded. When this
separation is impossible, Colorado courts have consistently held
evidence of these "secondary" acts to be admissible as a part of
the res gestae. It would seem from the definition above that the
courts may so do. In Pearsonv. People,3 the court admitted as part
of the res gestae, evidence surrounding defendant's arrest, taking
of arms from him, and the like.
In Piela v. People,4 it appeared that, during an affray, defendant who was indicted for assaulting A with intent to murder, also
assaulted B. The assault upon B was held to be a part of the res
* Students, University of Denver College of Law.

'Beasley, C. Jim, Hunter v. State, 40 N.J. L. 536.
2 Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 1539.
,Pearson v. People, 69 Colo. 76, 168 P. 155 (1917).
4 Piela v. People, 6 Colo. 343 (1882).
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gestae, and the court said that the conviction under the indictment would not be set aside because the witness, in describing
the affray, spoke of the assault upon B. In Garcia v. People,5 evidence was admitted, as part of the res gestae, showing that the
defendant had committed an assault upon another and while trying to escape, killed the deceased (for whose murder he was being
tried) while resisting arrest. As can be seen by these cases, the
question raised by the court when considering admissibility is
whether the act, about which testimony is attempted to be introduced, is a part of the transaction in issue. While the wisdom of
calling this a part of the res gestae may be questioned by many,
it is well established in Colorado that such acts must be considered
as within the res gestae.
Verbal acts are utterances which accompany some act or conduct to which it is desired to give a legal effect. When an act has
intrinsically no definite legal significance, or is ambiguous, its
legal purport or tenor may be ascertained by considering the words
accompanying it. These utterances thus enter as a verbal act. The
use of utterances as verbal acts has four limitations:6 (a) The
conduct to be characterized by these words must be material to
the issue; (b) it must be equivocal in its nature; (c) the words
must aid in giving legal significance to the conduct; and (d) the
words must accompany the conduct.
A spontaneous exclamation may be defined as a statement or
exclamation made immediately after some exciting occasion by a
participant or spectator, asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him. The admissibility of such an exclamation is based on the experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective
faculties and removes control. The utterance which then occurs
is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this
utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during
the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have
been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the
real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by
7
him.
The confusion arises when the courts speak of res gestae as
embodying but one logic, whereas in reality all of the above three
segments mentioned have as a basis a different logical principle.
The logic behind the contemporaneous act is that if the court
is to reach the truth of the matter asserted, it is sometimes necessary to testify to an act which is closely connected with the main
act. This evidence concerning a contemporaneous act is admitted
'Garcia v. People, 59 Colo. 434, 149 P. 614 (1915).
Wigmore Evidence, § 1772 (2d ed.).
'Id. at § 1747.
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through the doctrine of necessity, not as substantive evidence,
but as an act so closely connected with the main act that it is impossible to separate the two. These acts do not come under the
hearsay rule as an exception because they are not hearsay evidence. In Garcia v. People, supra, an example is given in which
the court stated that, "evidence that the defendant had been ejected
from a hotel and stabbed the person who ejected him, was relevant
as part of the res gestae on prosecution for killing the officer who
attempted to arrest him." As shown by the court, these acts
were so closely connected as to be impossible of separation.
As to verbal acts, there should be no objection to their admission because, as shown by the definition, they are not hearsay
but are merely a verbal phrase with accompanies and gives a
legal significance to the equivocal act. In the case of Pickens v.
Davis,8 the testatrix had made statements to the effect that when
she cancelled her second will, the first will was not revived. It
was held that these statements were verbal acts accompanying
and explaining the equivocal act of revocation. 9
Spontaneous declarations are true hearsay statements. They
are introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted. They
are extra-judicial statements, not under oath, and with no opportunity to cross examine. Furthermore, the declarant is often not
in court. SpDntaneous declarations are admitted because the circumstances under which they are made indicate that they may be
believed. The logic behind the admission of these statements is
based on common sense. In the experience of men, there are events
which are so shocking that an utterance spontaneously made while
still under the influence of this event (and about this event) are
to be given evidentiary value because of the likelihood of truth.
These are proper exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Colorado does not clearly distinguish between these three segments of res gestae. For instance, in the case of Martinez v. People, 0 the court said, "res gestae may be defined as matter incidental to the main fact and explanatory thereof, including acts
and words so closely connected therewith as to constitute a part
of it; the circumstances, facts, and declarations, which spring
out of the main fact, are contemporaneous with it, and serve to
illustrate its character." This is typical of the Colorado construction of the rule. There is no allowance made for the difference
in logic underlying the three segments mentioned. In the case of
IndustrialComm. v. Fotis,1 the court further states that "res gestae,
while often spoken of as an exception to the hearsay rule, is generally not such in fact but ordinarily it relates to statements which
because of their intimate relation to facts become a part of those
8Pickins v. Davis, 134 Mass. 257.
'See also for examples of verbal acts the following Colorado cases: Sharp
v. McIntire, 23 Colo. 99, 46 P. 115 (1896); Wilcoxen v. Morgan, 2 Colo. 473
(1875); Wilson v. Birt, 77 Colo. 206, 235 P. 563 (1925).
1055 Colo. 51, 132 P.

"112

64 (1913).

Colo. 423, 149 P. 2d 657 (1944).
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facts and are therefore admitted as such." Is the reference here
to spontaneous declarations, verbal acts, or contemporaneous acts?
Further the supreme court, in the recent Colorado case of
Stahl v. Cooper,12 states: "Res gestae are events speaking for
themselves, through the instinctive words or acts of participants,
not the words or acts of participants when narrating the events,
and what is done or said by participants under the immediate spur
of a transaction becomes thus part of the transaction, because it
is then the transaction that speaks." This could encompass either
or both verbal acts and spontaneous declarations. The court further states, "A statement, if part of the res gestae, must be in
the nature of an exclamation rather than an explanation, and
must be spontaneous and instinctive rather than deliberate." This,
while an excellent statement of a spontaneous declaration, is not
definitive of a verbal act. If the courts were to follow the latter.
statement and apply it to verbal acts as part of the res gestae,
this would necessarily limit the admission of verbal acts. Yet,
in this same case, the supreme court stated, "The tendency is to
broaden, rather than to restrict, the res gestae rule."
Colorado courts have taken the generally accepted two segments of res gestae and added a third which we have called "contemporaneous acts." These are all truly a part of the transaction.
Spontaneous declarations are exceptions to the hearsay rule; verbal
acts and contemporaneous acts are not within this rule. This is
the only point of difficulty. It is necessary for the Colorado practitioner to keep constantly in mind the difference in logic underlying the admission of the three. The danger inherent in res gestae
lies in trying to apply the same logic to all segments. This is, of
course, impractical. Spontaneous declarations are admitted because the circumstances under which they are made point up the
probability of their truth; verbal acts are admitted because they
are not considered statements (and therefore cannot be hearsay),
but as a part of the act which they explain; contemporaneous acts
are not hearsay because they are not statements and are admitted
(if objected to on other grounds) because it is impossible to testify to the main fact without talking about these acts also.
There is no reason why these three segments of res gestae
should not exist side by side. With a thorough understanding of
all three, the doctrine of res gestae can go on serving the ends
of justice.
BOOK TRADERS CORNER
Volumes 1 through 55 of Corpus Juris Secundum and volumes
1 through 239 of the Pacific Reports, second series, are offered
for sale by Attorney John B. Barnard of Granby, Colorado. Mr.
Barnard informs us that he might be interested in trading these
for other volumes needed for his library.
11117 Colo. 468, 190 P. 2d 891 (1948).
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REAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW
ALBERT BRENMAN AND ROBERT ROSNIK*

Demonstrative or real evidence is evidence addressed directly
to the senses without the intervention of witnesses, as by actual
sight, hearing, or taste. In criminal law such evidence is inadmissible if it explains no fact and is not relevant to any disputed
issue. Models, casts, and other reproductions of relevant objects
may be used to illustrate oral testimony.1 In this article an attempt
will be made to point out various types of real evidence that the
Colorado Supreme Court has held admissible.
REAL EVIDENCE WHICH FORMS PART OF THE TRANSACTION

Articles which form a part of the transaction or which serve
to unfold or explain it may be accepted in evidence if they are
properly identified and are in substantially the same condition as
at the time of the offense.
In Cliff v. People 2 where the defendant, a bank president,
was being prosecuted for embezzlement, certain bank books and
memoranda were admitted over the defendant's objection that
they were not in defendant's handwriting and were not shown to
have been made under defendant's direction or with his knowledge. The supreme court held that such direction and knowledge
need not be proved by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence
being sufficient. Here the bank was small, the president was in
direct control and there was an unavoidable inference that all
book entries and memos were made with defendant's knowledge
and direction.
In Trujillo v. People,3 the defendant was charged with failure
to provide support for an illegitimate child of the complaining
witness. The court was confronted with the admissibility of a
hotel register which the defendant acknowledged signing on three
separate occasions, claiming that on those occasions he was at
the hotel with a woman other than the complainant. The register
was admitted in evidence after being identified by the husband
of the owner of the hotel even though such witness had not seen
the defendant sign it. The supreme court sustained the trial
court's ruling admitting the register in evidence, for not only
did the complainant identify defendant's signature, but on crossexamination the defendant admitted signing the book. The register merely corroborated the testimony of the parties.
PROPERTY OF THE ACCUSED

Property of the accused which is sufficiently identified and
shown to belong to the accused or to have come from his possession, and which throws light upon the crime or serves to connect
the accused with it, is admissible. The accused may be permitted
to introduce property belonging to him to impeach the prosecu* Students, University of Denver College of law.
122 C.J.S. 1201 § 708.
84 Colo. 254, 269 P. 907 (1928).
'122 Colo. 436, 222 P. 2d 775 (1950).
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tion's witness. In Wolf v. People 4 where the defendant was
charged with burglary with force, burglary without force, and
receiving stolen goods, evidence consisting of articles identified
as stolen from the premises were held admissible by the Colorado
court. These articles were recovered by police either in the apartment occupied by defendant and his wife, in the shop of defendant, or otherwise definitely proven to have been in his possession
shortly after the buglary in question.
The defendants in Rude v. United States 5 were charged with
false advertising through the mails with intent to defraud. The
court allowed in evidence a suit purchased by a post office inspector which was advertised as an unclaimed $5 suit but which turned
out to be a regular stock suit.
In a suit for divorce on the grounds that the wife shot at
her husband, there was admitted into evidence a pistol, alleged
to have been used by the wife, and a coat worn by the plaintiff
through which the bullet was alleged to have passed. 6 It was said
to be within the discretion of the trial court to allow the jury to
have the pistol and coat in the jury room during their deliberations. The supreme court said that the trial court's discretion
will not be interfered with in the absence of manifest abuse. The
court further stated that it was proper that the objects to which
testimony relates should be brought into court and exhibited,
when this can be done. This was said to be more satisfactory than
descripti,
of such evidence by witnesses who have inspected
it outside of court.
In a case in which the defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit arson and consipracy to burn a house to defraud
the insurers, a valise and a bundle of letters addressed to the husband of the owner of the house were admitted in evidence to
show knowledge and preparation for the crime. The sole purpose
of admitting this evidence was to show that the owner of the
house, a defendant, was expecting the house to barn, and therefore, articles
such as these would naturally have been removed
7
by him.
PROPERTY OF THE VICTIM

Property of the injured or killed party found at the scene
of the crime or accident, in or about the defendant's possession,
or elsewhere, is admissible in evidence. For example, in a prosecution for homicide, the deceased's bloodstained clothing was admitted over the defendant's objection the defendant stating that
the exhibition was unnecessary and was calculated to, and did,
arouse the passions of the jurors and sway their judgment. The
court held, on appeal, that if evidence is competent, relevant, and
material as this evidence was, it should not be rejected because
it brings vividly to the jury the details of a shocking crime. This,
1123 Colo. 487, 230 P. 2d 581 (1951).
574 Fed. 2d 673 (1935).
'Fowler v. Fower, 63 Colo. 451, 168 P. 648 (1917).
I Mukuri v. People, 92 Colo. 306, 19 P. 2d 1040 (1933).
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the court said is the lawful purpose of evidence. Such holding is
in accord with the general rule that although the introduction of
real evidence may incite the jury, it may be admitted
as long
8
as it illustrates and makes clear the issue of the case.
In an early federal case 9 where the problem of admitting
demonstrative evidence arose, the court held that clothing worn
by deceased at the time of the accident is admissible for the purpose of identifying the deceased and establishing the nature and
extent of the injuries. A later case, 10 held that there was no error
in admitting in evidence burned shoes worn by decedent when
death occurred from contact with a high tension wire. The shoes
were admitted to support the plaintiff's theory that the decedent
slipped on the roof of a house and came in contact with the wirea.
This evidence tended to show how the accident came about because
of marks of paint and striations on the shoes. The court stated
that the plaintiff had a right to prove his theory, and such evidence ought not to be rejected unless it clearly has no tendency
to prove or disprove relevant facts.
INSTRUMENTS OF THE CRIME

Weapons, instruments, and articles identified as the means
by which a crime was committed are admissible, provided they
are substantially in the same condition as at the time of the offense.
In Brown v. People 11 the defendant was charged with statutory
rape. The evidence introduced was a prophylactic wrapper which
the sheriff had found the next morning when he searched the
automobile in which the alleged offense was committed. This substantiated the victim's statement that the defendant made use
of a contraceptive. Likewise, in a case where the defendant was
charged with burglary and the possession of burglary tools, a
tire iron and other tools, which were not intrinsically burglary
tools, were properly admitted to show possession of burglary tools,
a separate crime, after the jury had found the defendant guilty
of the crime of burglary. The only objection of the defendant was
that he should not have been convicted of the burglary because
of lack
of sufficient identification, which issue was resolved against
2
him.'
In an abortion case 13 where the defendant was found and arrested while attending the prosecuting witness, it was held proper
to admit in evidence the tools used in the abortion, which consisted of a bottle containing white pills and other pills in yellow
cellophane both trade-marked "HR", a dark fluid in a bottle, a
metal piece with a rubber hose attached thereto, a grease gun,
and a speculum.
'Maoya v.°People, 8.8 Colo. 139, 293 P. 335 (1930).
'Baggs v. Martin, 108 Fed. 33, 44 C.C.A. 175 (1901).
1"Southern Colo. Power Co. v. Pestano, 80 Colo. 375, 251 P. 224 (1926).
11120 Colo. 493, 210 P. 2d 837 (1949).
12Smalley v. People, 116 Colo. 598, 183 P. 2d 558 (1947).
"Montgomery v. People, 117 Colo. 118, 184 P. 2d 480 (1947).
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CLOTHING OF THE ACCUSED

Articles of clothing belonging to or connected with the accused
and sufficiently identified and connected with the crime are admissible when they tend to throw light on a material inquiry and
are in substantially the some condition as at the time of the offense.
Thus in Burnham v. People 14 where the defendant was convicted
of receiving -iolen goods, the court said that clothing other than
that found in defendant's possession but part of the stock of
merchandise stolen from the same store in the same transaction
was admissible to show that the clothing he did have in his possession had been stolen. This is illustrative of an exception to
the rule that evidence of other crimes is not admissible against
the defenda~t. Evidence of thefts of other goods from the same
owner by the same thief is admissible where it is connected with
the same transaction.
LIQUOR
Liquors and related articles identified as having been in the
possession of the accused or otherwise connected with him are
admissible, provided there has been no substantial change in their
condition. In Enyart v. People,'1 the Colorado court held that
where defendant was charged with violation of the Prohibition
Act it was proper for the jury to look at and smell of the liquor
alleged to be intoxicating for the purpose of determining its character.
PEOPLE As REAL EVIDENCE
In general the jury may view the injured person to see his
scars and wounds if they tend to solve or are material to a controverted issue. This admission is competent even when it shows
horrible consequences of an assault. However, a connection must
be shown with the crime committed. For the purpose of showing
the fact of a birth of a child, where such fact is material, the admission of the child is competent; but when the paternity is in
question, the authorities are divided on the child's admissibility
to show the resemblance of the child to its putative father. A
search failed to reveal a pertinent Colorado case on the subject.
DEMONSTRATIONS

Demonstrations to illustrate matters in issue may be permitted
in the court's discretion. In an automobile negligence case, Small
v. Clark, 6 toy automobiles and maps of the scene, both drawn and
built to scale, were held admissible. These were for illustrative
purposes in connection with the testimony.
PHOTOGRAPHS

Photographs, though not considered demonstrative evidence
are very closely related thereto, and for that reason are mentioned
here. In a recent Colorado case, the defendant assaulted his wife
and threw her down steep basement steps. The next morning he
14 104

Colo. 472, 93 P. 2d 899 (1939).
1"70 Colo. 362, 201 P. 564 (1921).
1683 Colo. 211, 263 P. 933 (1928).
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found her body at the bottom of the steps. He buried her in the
body of
cellar. Photographs were admitted of the decomposed
17
the victim. The court held these admissible, saying,
Photographs are the pictured expressions of data, observed by a witness. They are often more accurate than
any description by words, and give clearer comprehension of the physical facts than can be obtained from testimony of witnesses. Ordinarily, photographs are competent evidence of anything which it is competent for a
witness to described in words. Their admissibility does
not depend upon whether the objects they portray could
be described in words, but on whether it would be helpful to permit the witness to supplement his description by their use. They are not inadmissible because
they bring vividly to the jurors, the details of a shocking crime, or tend to arouse passion or prejudice. It
is only when photographs do not illustrate or make
clear some issue of the case and are of such a character
as to prejudice the jury, that they are not admissible. Its
admission rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge,
and his decision will not be disturbed on review unless
an abuse of discretion is shown.
CONCLUSION
Demonstrative evidence is the most clear cut and convincing
type of evidence which may be brought before a court. A search
of the Colorado cases does not reveal an instance where the supreme court has overruled the trial court's discretion in admitting
evidence of this type. As long as the articles admitted are connected in some manner to the case, and tend to shed light on
motive, means, or manner of the act or crime, their admissibility
will be sustained, even though such admission might inflame or
enrage the jurors to prejudice.
Wigmore has aptly expressed the general consensus in regard
to this matter as follows

:18

It seems too rigorous to forbid a party to prove his
case by the clearest evidence, and a jury which through
violent prejudice would not be restrained by the court's
instructions would probably give way to its prejudice
even without this evidence. The courts impose no prohibition except so far as the discretion of the trial courts
may prevent abuses.
VPotts v. People, 114 Colo. 253, 158 P. 2d 739 (1945). See also Carson v.
People, 93 Colo. 478, 26 P. 2d 1068 (1933); Rowan v. People, 93 Colo. 473, 26
P. 2d 1066 (1933); Mow v. People, 31 Colo. 351, 72 P. 1069 (1903); Moya v.
People, 88 Colo. 139, 293 P. 335 (1930); King v. People, 87 Colo. 11, 285 P. 157
(1930); De Salvo v. People, 98 Colo. 368, 56 P. 2d 28 (1938) ; Millitella v. People,
95 Colo. 519, 37 P. 2d 527 (1934); Maynes v. People, 110 Colo. 149, 200 P. 2d
915 (148).
1OWigmore on Evidence, § 1158, p. 259 (3d ed.)

DICTA

July, 1952

THE DEFENDANT AS A WITNESS
KENNETH W. ROBINSON
of the Denver Bar

In the ordinary case, the defendant will take the stand as a
matter of course. After all he stands charged with crime. He
has plead not guilty. 'The State has presented its evidence. The
motion for directed verdict has been overruled. And the jury
properly wants to hear his story.
If the defendant does not testify, there must be the most compelling of reasons. Obviously, no lawyer will assume that the presumption of innocence and the instruction upon failure to testify
will satisfy the natural feeling of the jury and of us all that an innocent man will be anxious to present his defense in person on the
stand. And unfavorable inferences likely will be drawn when he
elects not to do so.
Occasionally, however, serious questions arise in our minds
whether more harm than good will be done by offering our client
as a witness. Unfortunately, there are no books to guide us; there
are no precedents to be examined. We must trust alone to whatever inate ability we have to gauge the situation at hand and to
appraise the overall picture and pray for a large measure of good
luck.
This question generally grows out of one or more of the following situatinns which may cnnfrnnt us at the end of the State's
case.
First: Will the defendant's testimony supply some proof missing from the State's case, and which we believe to be vital before
conviction can be had?
Second: Will our client's cross-examination probably reveal
guilt of other offenses? These may be offenses of which he presently stands charged or which will result in the bringing of additional charges.
Third: Is the personality of our client such that he will make
a very unimpressive witness who may convict himself?
Fourth: Has he a criminal record?
As to the first, unless we are satisfied in our own minds that
the State has actually failed to prove its case and that an appellate court will so hold, it is submitted the defendant better take
the stand. For experience cautions us not to rely too heavily in
the reviewing court upon technicalities. As one former Judge
used to say: What he was interested in was doing substantial
justice. And if the appellate court feels substantial justice has
been done, it will not look for technical reasons to reverse.
As to the second, certainly we do not want to find ourselves
in a position where a careful and thorough cross-examination of
our client will prove that he is guilty of other offenses as well as
the one presently on trial. Perhaps here it would be better to
rely upon the weakness of the State's case, presumption of in-
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nocence and the court's instruction that the failure to testify is
no evidence of guilt.
As to the third, the fact that our client does not appear to
us as a man of impressive personality, or that he will make a
"good" witness should not keep us from remembering at all times
that this is his day in court and it is he who may have to serve
many years upon conviction. It seems reasonable to believe that
if he is convicted there will be many nights and days in the penitentiary when he will wonder why he did not testify. It is well
to remember that an acquitted man generally believes it was because of his own sagacity; a convicted one knows it was the fault
of his lawyer.
Perhaps it is the fourth of the situations outlined, our client's
former criminal record, that causes us the most trouble in determining whether he should testify. We realize, of course, that unless he takes the stand, the jury will not be advised of his former
record. If he does testify, that fact will be known. What shall
we do about it? There is no answer which will apply to all cases.
There is no formula by which we can resolve the question. We
must sense the state of the case and the feeling in the court room,
which is probably reflected in the jury box, to determine whether
it is necessary to risk the development of this information.
One or two considerations may help us in trying to decide.
What was the nature of the former conviction? How long ago
was it? Does our client's record contain other convictions as well,
or is it only orie? If his record, shall we say, is that of involuntary
manslaughter some years ago and he is now on trial for some business offense, embezzlement, falsification of records, et cetera, and
the State's case against him is strong, it would seem probably the
part of wisdom to put him on the witness stand. If, however, our
client once before has served a term for embezzlement, and is
again on trial for embezzlement, and We have other evidence apart
from his testimony which can be produced to counteract the State's
case at least in part, perhaps it is well not to put the defendant
on the stand, but to rely on the inherent weakness of the State's
case plus such evidence apart from the defendant's testimony as
we can muster.
If he does testify, you will, of course, want to bring out his
former convictions yourself. You will not want to wait for crossexamination to develop this. I am sure we are all in agreement
from the standpoint of trial tactics that if there is something
damaging, and you know it will be brought out from the witness,
it is best to bring it out yourself in the course of your. own examination.
There is no easy solution. It has always seemed, however,
in the last analysis the defendant should take the witness stand
and should testify unless, as noted, there are overwhelming reasons why he should not. If, after careful consideration, you still
are in doubt, it is recommended that the defendant take the stand.

DICTA

July, 1952

And if he does not take the stand, by all means have him
give you a note in his own handwriting, stating it is his view,
as well as yours, that he should not testify and requesting you
not to call him as a witness. If he has a wife, she should approve
in writing this note. The advisability of such precaution was
impressed upon me as a prosecutor in the '20's. In a serious case,
involving the failure of a bank in Denver,* the defendant on trial
did not take the stand. After his conviction, he charged his lawyers with many derelictions, among them, their refusal to let him
testify. They were able and experienced trial lawyers. These
lawyers presented to the District Court a letter signed by the
defendant stating that his position was that he should not take
the witness stand. Without that letter it might have been very
embarrassing.
Frankly, I am afraid this last suggestion, always to take a
letter from the defendant if he does not testify, is about all that
may have been contributed by this discussion.
Whatever your decision, you never can be satisfied you were
right or just lucky.
!

CASE: COMME:NTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE SANCTITY OF A LEGISLATIVE ACT IS SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE LEGISLATURE ITSELF-WHAT AMOUNTS TO AN EFFECTIVE REPEAL ?-Plaintiffs brought action to recover a judgment for
treble damages allegedly due them by reason of the defendant's
having collected interest on a loan in excess of that allowed under
chapter 108 Session Laws of Colorado, 1913. The defendant demonstrated that chapter 157, Session Laws of Colorado, 1935, stated
that the 1913 Act was repealed; that the compilers of the 1,935
Colorado Statutes Annotated thereafter omitted the 1913 Act
from their compilation; that the State Banking Commissioner
discontinued enforcing the provisions of the 1913 Act in reliance
of the 1935 Act; and that loan companies generally considered
the 1913 Act repealed. On defendant's motion the case was dismissed with prejudice, and the plaintiffs appealed. On May 12,
1952, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the decision of the
trial court, declaring that the 1913 Act had not been effectively
repealed by the 1935 Act insofar as loans over $300 were concerned since the 1935 Act by its title was confined to loans of $300
or less. This despite the fact that the body of the 1935 Act "repealed" the former Act. (Sullivan v. Siegal. ..... Colo ........ ...... P.
....... ) (1952.)
Speaking through Mr. Justice Alter, the court held that the
* Mandell v. People, 76 Colo. 296.
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repealing clause of the 1935 Act was unconstitutional as violative
of section 21, Article V of the Colorado Constitution. That section provides, "No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall
be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any
act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be
void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed." The
court dismissed in summary fashion the argument based on the
fact that the administrative official and the loan companies had
considered the law repealed. In a similar summary fashion, and
with some disdain, the court dismissed the argument that exclusion from a compilation of laws operated as a repeal of the law
thus excluded, stated that such compilations were only prima facie
the existing law. The court even expressed doubts as to the validity
of the delegation of authority which might be necessary if such
compilations were to be regarded on the higher plane and dignity
of a basic and fundamental law.
A Case Comment is a beautifully expeditious kind of literary
expression. It enables the writer to criticize, to laud, to prophesy
or to simply communicate an impression. The writers of this comment have chosen the latter usage and have felt that the decision
lends itself irresistibly to parody. We submit the following as a
memorial to insure that the decision will rank among the great
documents of American history.
DENVER ADDRESS
One score and nineteen
years ago, our legislators
brought forth upon the
statute books a new law,
conceived of necessity, and
dedicated to the proposition
that interest on loans is
subject to control. Now we
are engaged in a great litigation, testing whether
that statute or other statutes so conceived and so
dedicated, do yet endure.
We are met in the forum
of that litigation. We have
come to set aside in their
final resting place t ho s e
laws which, by their defective repealing attempts,
permit that early law to
live. It is altogether fitting
and proper that we do this.
But, in a larger sense,
we cannot legislate, we can-

DECLARATION OF
INTERDEPENDENCE
We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all laws are created
by the Legislature, that they are
endowed by their creators with
certain unalienable r i g h ts, that
among these are the Right to control the conduct of men, Freedom
from interference by other
branches of government and Persistence into perpetuity until effectively repealed. That to clarify and
effectuate these laws, compilers
and administrators are instituted
among lawyers, deriving their just
Powers from the Legislature, that
whenever any act of desuetude of
compilers or administrators becomes destructive of these Ends,
it is the Duty of the courts to alter
or abolish this improper Delegation and to reinstate the Law, laying its foundation on such Principles and organizing its Powers in
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not repeal, we cannot alter
the laws. Those brave legislators, living and dead,
who struggled to do so have
passed laws b e y o n d our
powed to add or detract.
The state will little note,
nor long remember what
we say here, but in can
never forget what they did
here. It is for us, the court,
rather to be dedicated to
the unfinished work which
those who enacted these
laws have thus far so nobly
advanced. It is rather for
us to be here dedicated to
the great task remaining
before us, that from this
mass of conflicting law, we
take as repealed only that
which they have effectively
repealed; that we here
highly resolve that those
who prize their Session
Laws shall not have saved
in vain; that this court
shall declare the law, and
that control of loan interest, by the legislature, and
for the borrowers, shall not
perish from future compilations of Colorado Law.
JAMES TILLY
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such form as to them shall seem
most likely to effect the Integrity
of the courts. Prudence, indeed,
will dictate that Laws long established should not be disregarded
for light and transient causes; and
accordingly all Jurisprudence has
shown that Debtors are more disposed to suffer high Interest rates,
while the evils are sufferable, than
to right themselves by abolishing
the forms of Usury to which they
are extra-judicially accustomed.
But when a long strain of abuses,
usuries and usurpations pursuing
invariably the same Unconstitutional object evinces a design to
reduce the people under absolute
Usury, it is their Right, it is their
Duty to throw off the prerogatives
of the compilers, administrators
and money lenders, and to restore
the old laws for their future interests.
We, therefore, the Justices of
the Supreme Court of the State of
Colorado, in court assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of
the World for the rectitude of our
Intentions, do, in the name and by
the authority of the good people of
the State of Colorado, solemnly
publish and declare that insofar
as it has not been effectively repealed, the Moneylenders' Act of
1913 is, and of right ought to be,
a fully effective and all controlling
law; that it abolishes all Allegiance
to compilers, administrators and
money lenders; and that all extralegislative con n e c t ion between
them is and ought to be totally
dissolved; that it has the full power to levy war on money lenders,
conclude triple damage settlements, control usurious contracts
and do all other acts and things
which fully effective laws may of
right Do.
GEORGE BARBARY
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DOUBLE TROUBLE OR NEVER SUE A LAWYER
FLOYD F. MILES
of the Denver Bar and Supreme Court Librarian

Aaron H. Palmer, Esquire, was a "respectable citizen," counsellor at law and master in chancery. Francis Mezzara was an
"eminent artist" from Rome. Mutual friends introduced them.
This was a mistake.
The winter of 1816-1817 in New York was cold and dreary.
Mezzara was in need of meat and raiment. Palmer, Esquire, (like
some lawyers of this day) was fat of purse and stuffed with vanity.
Having viewed himself in a mirror with satisfaction, he deemed
it fitting and proper that the image he there beheld should be preserved on canvas for future generations to look upon in awe and
wonder, he therefore commissioned Mezzara to paint his portrait.
When the Work was completed, Palmer, probably influenced by
convivial friends, who pronounced the picture more of a caricature
than a portrait, declined to accept it, and, after hot words had
passed, refused to pay for it. Mezzara, Wounded in his pride,
and considering the rejection a base and unjustified reflection on
his skill and talent, vowed he would have satisfaction. He then
forged the first link in his chain of disaster. He brought suit
against Palmer for the agreed fee.
Upon trial, the jury after comparing the original with the
portrait, concluded that Palmer was justified in refusing to accept
it and returned a verdict for the defendant. Judgment for costs
was entered against the plaintiff. Palmer was not one to forget
small sums owing him and in due time procured an execution and
placed it in the hands of the sheriff, with instruction to levy upon
any property of Mezzara to be found in the county. When the
sheriff appeared at his studio and demanded payment, Mezzara
denied having or owning any property whatever, except the rejected portrait, which he suggested the sheriff might levy upon
if it pleased his fancy. The sheriff, being an honest and conscientious public officer, it being before the days of corruption in
New York City, and seeing nothing else of a tangible nature about,
decided to do so, whereupon a friend of Mezzara came forward
and gave bond for the production of the picture at the execution
sale.
On the morning of the sale the following advertisement appeared in the "Republican Chronicle" a nonpartisan newspaper
published in New York at the time:
"CURIOUS SHERIFF'S SALE. We have been requested to announce that there will be sold, this afternoon at public vendue, at
No. 133 Water Street, a PICTURE intended for the likeness of a
gentleman in this city, who ordered it painted. But as the gentleman
disclaimed it, it remained the property of the painter, and Is now
seized in execution. In order to enhance its value, the painter, who
is an eminent artist from Rome, has decorated it with a pair of
long ears, such as are usually worn by a certain stupid animal. The
goods can be inspected previous to the sale."

The sale attracted a large crowd and there was considerable
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giggling, as well as some open guffawing. The crowd became so
great that the auctioneer had to remove the picture to a back
room. Mr. Palmer, hanging about the outskirts of the throng and
observing the obvious enjoyment of those present, decided that the
best thing to do was bid the picture in and destroy it. To this end
he authorized a clerk to bid in his name up to $30.00. It wasn't
enough. The picture went to another bidder for $40.00. Angered
and humiliated by the exhibition of himself in public adorned with
ass's ears, Palmer repaired to the state's attorney where he swore
out a warrant for criminal libel against Mezzara.
On August 4, 1817 the criminal case came on for trial before
the Court of General Sessions and a jury. Impassioned addresses
were made to the jury by counsel on both sides. James W. Wilkin,
one of the most eloquent of counsel for the state inquired: "Where
is this conduct to stop? Should you acquit him, he still continues
to hold up this respectable citizen, this counsellor and master in
chancery, to public contempt and ridicule. Should you find him
guilty, I am not certain but that, to revenge himself, he will draw
your pictures with his ass's ears! And I fear their honors on
the bench will share the same fate!"
After considering the matter from eleven o'clock in the evening till nine o'clock the next morning, the jury returned a verdict
of guilty. The Court sentenced the prisoner to pay a fine of $100.00.1
There is no evidence that Mezzara was able to pay his fine,
and it may be assumed that he took up quarters in the debtor's
goal. There in the quiet comfort of his dungeon, away from the
distractions and bustle of city life, he would have leisure (at the
expense of the taxpayers) to reflect upon the folly of suing a
lawyer.

A PENTECOSTAL DECREE*
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that
L. J. Turner died intestate on the 2nd day of February, 1945, at
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, leaving surviving her as her only heirs
at law the persons whose names and relationship to said deceased
are as follows:
F. E. Turner, son of Deceased,
3131 East Riverside Drive,
Amarillo, Texas
B. E. Turner, daughter of Deceased,
185 Mountain Drive,
Midland, Texas
and that thereupon the said decedent descended to her heirs at
law and is now vested in them, subject to administration, and that
said heirs are the only heirs at law of said L. J. Turner, Deceased.
* Contributed by Roscoe Walker, Jr., who uncovered the decree In an abstract examination of certain property In Utah.
I People v. Mezzara, 1 Am. St. Tr. 60 (N.Y. 1817).

